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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
SELF-MADE HEIRSHIP TUROUGH MURDER.*
Can one automatically effectuate his own inheritance
by murder of an ancestor or testator?
Where the statute is silent upon this proposition, there
is a sharp and irreconcilable conflict of judicial authority.
The courts of different states are arrayed on opposite sides,
dissenting opinions pro alid con are numerous, and in one
state an unanimous opinion one way was on rehearing re-
placed by an unanimous opinion the other way.
In America the laws of descent, distribution and wills are
statutory. An analysis of the cases discloses that the ulti-
mate difference of opinion which produces this conflict of
decisions rests upon the willingness on the one hand or re-
fusal on the other, of the particular court passing upon the
question, to supply by implication an unexpressed exception
to the operation of the statutory laws of descent, distribution
or wills, in order that a seeming injustice may be avoided,
or in other words to hold that the legislature could not have
meant what it literally enacted as law.
All the authorities on both sides are collated in the recent
Third Edition of Woerner on "The American Law of Ad-
ministration" (1923), § 64a, p. 186 et seq., together with the
gist of the argument on each side.
I.
AUTHORITIES DENYING INHERITANCE.
The New York case of Riggs v. Palmer1 is the first and
leading one of that class which denies that one can benefit
himself as the devisee or heir of one whose life he has taken
to effectuate that purpose, though the statute makes no
such exception. There a devisee killed the testator to pre-
vent revocation of the will, for which he was convicted of
*By William F. Woerner of the St Louis Bar.
1. 115 N. Y. 506 (1889).
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murder. Arguing to justify its holding that he could take
nothing under the will, the court (two judges dissenting)
says (p. 509):
"It was the intention of the law makers that the donees
in a will should have the property given them. But it never
could have been their intention that a donee who murdered
the testator to make the will operative should have any
benefit under it. If such a case had been present to their
minds, and it had been supposed necessary to make some
provision of law to meet it, it cannot be doubted that they
would have provided for it .... A thing which is within
the letter of a statute is not within the statute, unless it be
within the intention of the makers."
The court then argues that the statutes of descents and
devises must be construed in the light of the principles or
maxims of the common law, which should be read into the
statute of descents and wills, so that in the absence of a
specific enactment to the contrary the murderer cannot
inherit, for, says the court, at common law (p. 511):
"No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud,
or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any
claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his
own crime. These maxims are dictated by public policy,
have their foundation in universal law administered in all
civilized countries, and have nowhere been superseded by
istatutes .... He murdered the testator expressly to invest
himself with an estate. Under such circumstances, what
law, human or divine, will allow him to take the estate and
enjoy the fruits of his crime? . . . . To answer these
questions in the affirmative, it seems to me, would be a re-
proach to the jurisprudence of our state, and an offence
against public policy."
That case is unqualifiedly approved and followed in Mis-
souri in Perry v. Strawbridge, decided 1908.2 There a hus-
2. 209 Mo. 261; 108 S. W. 641; 16 1& R. A. (N. S.) 244; 123 Am.
St. 510; 14 Ann. Cu. 92.
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band, under circumstances where the statute made him one
of the wife's heirs, killed her "without lawful provocation
or excuse" and a few hours later committed suicide. The
court held that his heirs could not take through him, by
reason of his act. Among other things the court says (p.
629):
"Can it be said that one, by high-handed murder, cannot
only make himself an heir in fact, when he had but a mere
expectancy before, but further shall enjoy the fruits of his
own crime? To use this seems abhorrent to all reason, and
reason is the better element of the law."
Although the Missouri statutory provisions of descent
are general, purporting to cover all cases, the court holds that
the common law inhibiting profit through crime makes an
exception, and says (p. 635):
"Has the common law in this respect been repealed,
changed or modified? We think not. If not, they (its max-
ims) are a part of our law. If not, then this statute must be
read in connection therewith and when so read the father
of appellees acquired no interest in the estate .... To our
mind our Statute of Descents and Distribution is so largely
expressive of the common law that we must consider these
maxims and the whole body of the applicable common-law
doctrines . . . . Our statutes of descents and distributions
both affirm and modify the common law, but nowhere spe-
cifically mention that rule or doctrine of the common law
which precluded the murderer from inheriting from his vic-
tim. This latter is not so inconsistent with the statute as to
call upon us to say that such portion of the common law,
previously existing, was repealed or changed .... The con-
struction contended for is one which shocks both common
right and common decency, and no court should be inclined
to other than a construction which would make the statute
comport with reason and the fundamental maxims of the
law. "
The court further holds that its ruling does not violate
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the provision of the state constitution against attainder
or corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate, on the ground
that no interest had ever vested in the murderer, hence there
was nothing upon which that provision could operate.
Intermediate between the above two cases is the Nebraska
case of Shallenberger v. Bansom.3 This case at first held
the same doctrine as announced in New York and Missouri.
It was an action for the partition of land conveyed by the
father of a tenant in common whom he had murdered for the
purpose of possessing himself of the property. The court
in the first opinion held that a purchaser could not derive
title from one who had murdered the ancestor from whom the
property was derived. (But that ruling was later reversed
on rehearing as below stated.)
Authorities that insurance cannot be collected by one
who murders the insured, not being cases of inheritance or
devise, will not be discussed here.
II.
AUTHORITES ALLOWING INHERITANCE.
Along such lines reason the cases holding that the courts
may read into the positive statutes of descents and wills
exceptions not contained therein. It is quite true that these
opinions give expression to what human sentiment persuades
us ought to be the law. But if a statute is plain no resort
to "construction" is permissible. The enactment of posi-
tive statutes is a legislative function, not to be revised or
usurped by the judiciary, however harsh they may seem.
The cases above referred to have therefore not carried with
them the weight of judicial authority, which holds that the
common law is superseded by our statutory laws directing
the course of inheritance intestate or intestate estates and
that courts cannot change them.
3. 31 Neb. 61.
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Thus, the earliest case of this tenor, Owens v. Owens,4
holds that a widow, convicted as an accessory to her hus-
band's murder, was nor debarred of dower, and that crime
could not intercept the inheritance of statutory heirs.
And it is significant that in the above cited case of Shal-
lenberger v. Ransom, on rehearing, three and a half years
laterc (1894, 41 Neb. 632), the court squarely recedes from
its former stand. In the final opinion the court says (p.
644):
"In our statute of descent there is neither ambiguity nor
room for construction. The intention of the legislature is
free from doubt. The question is not what the framers of
our statute of descent would have done had it been in their
minds that a case like this would arise, but what in fact they
did, without perhaps anticipating the possibility of its exist-
ence. This is determined. uot by hypothetical resort to
conjecture as to their meaning, but by a construction of the
language used. The majority opinion in Riggs v. Palmer,
as well as the opinion already filed in this case, seem to have
been prompted largely by the horror and repulsion with
which it may justly be supposed the framers of our statute
would have viewed the crime and its consequences. This is
no justification to this court for assuming to supply legisla-
tion, the necessity for which nas been suggested by subse-
quent events, but which did nu occur to the minds of those
legislators by .whom our statute of descent was framed.
Neither the limitations of the civil law nor the promptings
of humanity can be read into a statute from which, without
question, they are absent, no matter how desirable the result
to be attained may be."
So in Carpenter's Estate the court refused to amend the
positive law by decreeing a forfeiture of the inheritance of a
4. 100 N. C. 240 (decided 1888).
5. 1894, 41 Neb. 632.
6. 170 Pa. St. 203 (1895); one Judge dissenting.
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convicted parricide, and also held that to do so would vio-
late a constitutional provision against attainder of felony
or forfeiture of estate. The court i. a. observes:
"When the imperative language of a statute prescribes
that upon the death of a person his estate shall vest in his
children in the absence of a will, how can any doctrine, or
principle, or other thing called public policy, take away the
estate of a child and give it to some other person? The
intestate law casts the estate upon certain designated per-
sons, and this is absolute and peremptory, and the estate
cannot be diverted from those persons and given to other
persons without violating the statute. There can be no
public policy which contravenes the positive language of a
statute."
A similar decision is made in Deem v. Millikin 7 affirmed
"on the reasoning" of the lower court. The court criticises
the New York case, Saying:
"The well-considered cases warrant the pertinent con-
clusion that when the legislature, not transcending the limits
of its power, speaks in clear language upon a question of
policy, it becomes the judicial tribunals to remain silent
[citing cases] . . . . The decision in Riggs v. Palmer is a
manifest assertion of a wisdom believed to be superior to that
of the legislature upon a question of policy."
Recently authorities have come thick and fast, all of them
along these lines. After commenting on the cases herein-
above mentioned, the author in the third edition of W oerner's
"American Law of Administration," sec. 64a (p. 188) con-
tinues: "Similar rulings were thereafter made in a number
of other states, all holding that no exception can be en-
grafted by the courts upon the provisions of descent and
distribution because of the crime of the beneficiary in caus-
ing the death of the ancestor," and authorities are cited
7. 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 347; 53 Ohio St. 668 (1895).
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from nine other states, all of them directly so holding. So
that the author is well supported in his conclusions: "There
seems to be no escape oil principle from the conclusion that
at common law, and under the statutes and constitutions of
the various states of the Union, courts are not warranted in
disregarding the course of descent and distribution, or the
conclusiveness of duly executed wills, to divert the succes-
sion from the murderers of ancestors or testators, and the
authorities now strongly preponderate in this direction."
II.
SPECIC STATUTORY PROVISIONS.
The proposition under discussion is considered heretofore
in the absence of specific provisions on this point in the
statutes of descent, distribution and wills. But in a number
of states the subject has received the attention of legisla-
tures. In Judge Woerners work, above cited, the statutes of
ia number of states, and the constructions given to them, are
referred to.
Among these, it is provided in Mississippi, Iowa and
Tennessee, that one wilfully causing or procuring the death
of another, in any way, cannot inherit -from such other,
but the inheritance descends as intestate property, or as if
the slayer had never existed. In Iowa this is held not to
exclude one who makes herself a widow by her own deed,
because, it is held, her distributive share in her victim's
estate is not technically taken by way of inheritance (Kuhn
v. Kuho, supra); so in Tennessee, for like reasons, such
8. Grollnik's Estate, 112 Minn. 349, 128 N. W. 292; Bruns v. Cope,
182 Ind. 289, 105 N. E. 471; Kuhn v. Kuhn, 125 Iowa 449, 101 N. W. 151;
Emerson Estate (Iowa), 183 N. W. 327; Holloway v. McCormick (Okla.),
136 Pac. 1111; Harrison v. moncravie, 264 Fed. 776; Wall v. Pfauschmidt,
265 Ill. 180, 106 N. E. 785, L. P. A. 1915C, 328; McAllister v. Fair, 72
Kans. 533, 84 Pac. 112; Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S. W. 487;
Hagan v. Cone, Ga. App., 94 S. E. 602; Johnston v. Met. L. Ins. Co. (W.
Va.), 100 S. E. 865.
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statute is held not to apply to estates by the entirety, al-
though the husband slays his wife (Beddingfield v. Estill).9
Again, in Indiana, Kansas and Oklahoma the statute
provides that no person convicted of killing another shall
inherit from him. This statute is in Indiana held not to
apply to the widow's statutory award, because she takes
the same absolutely and not by descent, distribution or
devise: (Mertes' Estate)'0 ; nor does the mere aiding and
abetting of the homicide, without conviction, bring the case
within the statute (Bruns v. Cope, supra). And in Harrison
v. Moncravie1 the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals holds
that the statutes only apply to conviction within the state,
so that, though the statutes are similar in both Kansas and
oklahoma, yet a widow convicted in Kansas of killing her
husband, may inherit real estate in Oklahoma, because the
conviction was not in the latter state. So in California, a
statute that one convicted of murder of the decedent cannot
inherit, is held not to apply to a conviction for manslaughter:
(Kirby's Estate).12
It is to be noted that these constructions, refusing to apply
such statutes to cases not strictly within their terms, are
in line with those decisions which refuse to divert the
course of descent where the statute is altogether silent upon
the effect to be given to the crime of one who kills an an-
cestor or testator to possess himself of the estate of his
victim.
9. 118 Tenn. 39; 100 S. W. 108.
10. 181 Ind. 478; 104 N. W. 753.
1L 264 Fnd. 776.
12. 162 Cal. 91; 121 Pac. 370; 39 1. _ A. (N. S.) 1088; A=n. Cas.
1918C. 928
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